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Abstract 
We examine the transmission of the risk-taking channel to different industries using syndicated 
loans to U.S. borrowers from 1984 to 2018. We find that a one percentage point decrease in the 
shadow rate increases loan spreads by more than 30 basis points in the mining & construction and 
manufacturing sectors. The equivalent effect is lower in the services and trade industries, whereas 
the effect on the transportation & utilities and finance industries is less pronounced. Our results 
survive in several sensitivity tests and are immune to time-varying demand-side explanations. The 
identified differences in the potency of the risk-taking channel explain a significant part of the 
inferior performance of highly affected sectors compared to less-affected sectors in the year after 
a loan origination.        
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1. Introduction 
In the aftermath of the global financial crisis, there is increasing interest in the links between 
monetary policy and the soundness of the financial system. A vivid academic and policy debate 
pertains to the risk-taking channel of monetary policy (Borio and Zhu, 2012; Jimenez et al., 2014). 
The basic idea is that when monetary policy is lax for a prolonged period of time, the incentive for 
banks to take more risk increases. Thus, monetary policy affects not just the quantity of bank credit, 
but also its quality. In this paper, we ask two new questions with respect to the operation of the 
risk-taking channel. The first concerns whether the risk-taking channel is potent across different 
industries. The second asks whether industry heterogeneity in the potency of the risk-taking 
channel affects firms’ performance and thus has real implications.  
The answers to these questions are important for two interrelated reasons. First, industry 
asymmetries related to how monetary policy affects banks’ risk-taking might have real 
implications for investments and performance. Specifically, if lax monetary policy induces 
increased credit supply and riskier bank lending, there could be more liquidity to firms in industries 
that have inherently different risk profiles. These industry risk profiles might be different because 
of different types of capital employed, different horizons in investment materialization, different 
access to alternative sources of finance, etc.  
Second, asymmetries in the propagation of the risk-taking channel and any concomitant 
real effects have implications for economic policy. If monetary policy affects banks’ risk-taking 
in specific sectors, it is important for monetary policymakers to consider these asymmetries, 
especially as monetary policy moves toward unconventional tools that apply differently to 
different sectors and given that fiscal policy faces limitations in the presence of high sovereign 
debt. 
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 The risk-taking channel operates via four inextricable mechanisms. The first relates to the 
effect of monetary policy innovations (conventional or unconventional) on real valuations, 
incomes, and cash flows. For example, lower policy rates boost asset and collateral values and 
reduce price volatility, thereby downsizing bank estimates of probabilities of default and 
encouraging higher risk positions (Borio and Zhu, 2012). The second is the search-for-yield 
mechanism, with monetary expansions increasing the incentives for financial intermediaries with 
long-term liabilities and shorter-term assets to invest in riskier (and higher-yielding) assets in order 
to counteract decreasing profits (Rajan 2005). The third is the risk-shifting channel (Valencia 
2014), whereby lax monetary policy reduces banks’ funding costs and increases the monopolistic 
surplus they can extract from their borrowers. Under limited liability, this increased profitability 
leads banks to take excessive risks. Last, monetary policy may also affect risk-taking through the 
central bank’s reaction to negative shocks. For example, a central bank commitment of lower 
(future) interest rates in the case of a threatening shock reduces the probability of large downside 
risks, thereby encouraging banks to assume greater risk (transparency effect).  
Theory points to the role of market inefficiencies in an environment of falling interest rates 
and increasing asset prices, and it relates bank risk-taking with mispriced risk perceptions. Dubecq 
et al. (2009), for example, show that lower interest rates increase the scale of the underestimation 
of risk and amplify the overpricing of risky assets. In a similar vein, Acharya and Naqvi (2012) 
argue that when markets become flush with liquidity, banks tend to misprice downside risk, relax 
their lending standards, and increase credit availability. Afanasyeva and Güntner (2019) also show 
that after monetary policy expansions, profit-maximizing banks tend to lower their lending 
standards, relative to borrower collateral, to obtain a larger “share of the pie,” even if this raises 
the probability of firms to default ex post. All in all, misperceptions of firms’ riskiness result in a 
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“lending boom” that allows borrowers with bad credit histories and riskier projects to benefit from 
higher risk tolerance, especially when interest rates remain low for a prolonged period of time.  
In the presence of cross-industry differences in risk, reflecting inter alia their different 
degrees of sensitivity to changes in economywide factors (such as interest rates and unconventional 
policy tools), we conjecture that bank risk-taking behavior affects economic activity 
asymmetrically, with some sectors more vulnerable to a shift in banking-sector credit conditions. 
Specifically, Compustat data shows important differences in the leverage ratios or Tobin’s q of 
different industries. Leverage is higher in industries requiring more physical capital and making 
longer-term investments (e.g., manufacturing).   
We use data on all syndicated credit facilities (from DealScan) granted to borrowers in the 
United States from 1984 to 2018 and merge it with information on bank characteristics (from Call 
Reports) and firm characteristics (from Compustat). To account for unconventional monetary 
policy environments, we use the shadow short rate (SSR) of Krippner (2016). Empirical 
identification of the risk-taking channel poses four key challenges. The first is the observation of 
new risk (new loans), and this is the essence of using loan-level data. The second is distinguishing 
shifts in loan supply from shifts in loan demand. We control for loan demand by fielding our 
empirical model with firm × year fixed effects (controlling for firm-year variations in firm 
characteristics, including loan demand) and triple-interaction terms between our monetary policy 
variable with bank capital and firm risk (Jimenez et al., 2014; Ioannidou et al., 2015). Last, 
monetary policy is endogenous to other time-varying macroeconomic developments within a given 
year. To control for this type of endogeneity, we use Taylor residuals (constructed from the shadow 
rate) that are free of within-year variation in inflation and the output gap. Fourth, as an important 
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robustness test, we consider a Heckman-type model, which accounts for the probability of a firm 
using the syndicated loans market (and associated selection).      
We first identify the risk-taking channel in our full sample and show that the results are 
consistent with those of the extant literature. We note that less capitalized banks lend to riskier 
firms following a monetary policy expansion. Economically, these effects are large: a 1% decrease 
in the shadow rate increases the cost of loans by 25 basis points or $1.7 million USD for loans of 
average size and maturity. These results are robust to the use of Taylor residuals, the Heckman-
type model, distinguishing between term loans and credit lines, and other robustness tests. 
Subsequently, we distinguish between different industries using Standard Industrial 
Classification (SIC) codes. SIC codes are the most common industry classification system, also 
used by governments and the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). On this basis, we 
distinguish among firms in the mining & construction, manufacturing, transportation & utilities, 
trade (wholesale and retail), finance, and services industries.      
Applying our empirical model separately to these industries, we find that banks take on 
more risk in the mining & construction and manufacturing sectors. The estimated marginal effects 
show that a 1% decline in the shadow rate increases the cost of loans in these industries by 
approximately 30 basis points. We argue that these sectors are more vulnerable to the risk-taking 
channel because of their idiosyncrasies related to their intertemporal production decisions and high 
interest rate sensitivity. The corresponding effect is also considerable in the services and trade 
sectors (approximately 25 basis points), lower in transportation & utilities (approximately 16 basis 
points), and statistically insignificant in the financial sector. These results are again robust to 
several respecifications and robustness tests, and they are in fact stronger when using Taylor 
residuals as the monetary policy measure. 
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Importantly, we find that bank risk-taking in the most affected sectors leads to significant 
underperformance in these sectors due to the higher cost of lending. We find that that a 1% rise in 
the predicted cost of loans leads to a decline in Tobin’s q by 0.246, which is about 26% of its 
standard deviation. Thus, we document a new mechanism through which monetary policy shocks 
alter performance in different industries and thus potentially alter the accumulation of investment 
and resources in different industries.  
Our paper naturally relates to the risk-taking channel literature. The empirical evidence on 
the strength of the risk-taking channel flourished in the post-crisis period using mainly micro-level 
data in a panel dimension. Although these empirical works differ in how they gauge bank risk 
(expected default frequencies, proportion of risky assets, corporate loan spreads, confidential loan 
ratings, risk tolerance from bank lending surveys), their results indicate that monetary expansions 
induce banks to assume riskier behavior in different countries, including the United States (De 
Nicolò et al., 2010; Dell’ Ariccia et al., 2017; Delis et al., 2017; Paligorova and Santos, 2017), the 
Eurozone (Delis and Kouretas, 2011; Maddaloni and Peydró, 2011; Altunbas et al., 2014), Spain 
(Jimenez et al., 2014), and Bolivia (Ioannidou et al., 2015). A few studies examine the risk-taking 
channel from a macroeconomic perspective that endogenizes risk-taking behavior and relates it to 
monetary policy. These studies verify that expansionary monetary policy shocks raise bank risk 
tolerance (Angeloni et al. 2015), and this effect is stronger for smaller domestic banks (Buch et 
al., 2014). As an extension to this literature, Colletaz et al. (2018) investigate the existence of a 
systemic risk-taking channel at the macroeconomic level for the euro area. Based on causality 
measures, they find that causality from monetary policy to systemic risk accounts for 75% to 100% 
of the total dependence between the two variables in the long run.   
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These studies use mainly loan- or bank-level data, which cover the whole spectrum of 
economic activity, thereby ignoring industry heterogeneity in the transmission of the risk-taking 
channel. Nevertheless, the universality of the channel calls for a more detailed exploration of how 
banks’ risk appetite, resulting from accommodative monetary policy, affects different sectors of 
economic activity. Yet, evidence on this matter is very scarce. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the identification strategy, 
while section 3 presents the econometric model. Section 4 reports and discusses the empirical 
findings, and section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Data and empirical model 
2.1. Identifying the risk-taking channel 
Empirical identification of the risk-taking channel involves identifying compositional changes in 
credit supply toward higher credit-risk levels stemming from expansionary monetary policy (e.g., 
Jimenez et al., 2014; Ioannidou et al., 2015). The basic empirical model is of the general form: 
 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘-𝑡𝑎𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑏𝑡 = 𝑓(𝑀𝑃𝑡−1, 𝐶𝑏𝑡; 𝛽),       (1) 
 
where the risk-taking of bank b in quarter t is a function of a monetary policy variable (MP) at 
quarter t-1, other variables C affecting bank risk-taking, and a vector of parameters β. There are 
three interrelated problems to identify the causal effect of monetary policy on bank risk-taking 
(Jimenez et al., 2014; Ioannidou et al., 2015; Delis et al., 2017). The first is identifying the effect 
of monetary policy innovations on risk-taking (new risk) as opposed to pre-existing risk. This is 
important because we examine how lending policy changes with monetary conditions, as opposed 
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to restructuring existing bank assets. The second is distinguishing shifts in loan supply (the 
willingness of banks to make loans) from shifts in loan demand (loan demand by borrowers). The 
third is identifying exogenous changes in monetary policy (i.e., accounting for omitted variable 
bias stemming from other macroeconomic developments), which is increasingly difficult given the 
new monetary policy tools that emerged in the post-crisis period.  
To tackle these problems, we use loan-level data from DealScan and closely follow the 
identification strategy in the recent literature on the risk-taking channel. We impose the following 
structure on the syndicated loan data. We observe loan facilities to a firm by one or more lead 
banks. The lead banks decide the price and nonprice lending terms. We thus conduct our analysis 
at the lead-bank level, which implies that for one loan facility we might have more than one 
observation (corresponding to the number of lead banks for that loan facility). We keep all these 
observations because the lead bank reflects the supply-side loan decisions. The number of 
observations is 103,725, reflecting loan facilities originated by lead banks from 1984 to 2018. The 
number of unique loan facilities is 57,159, the number of lead banks is 676, and the number of 
firms is 8,472.    
The loan facilities are newly originated loans, corresponding to new risk. We can match 
the dates of loan originations with the dates of monetary policy announcements and solve the first 
identification problem (observing new risk). Further, the loan-level data significantly reduce 
concerns of identifying changes in loan demand along with changes in loan supply, especially 
when the data include repeated lending to the same borrowers within a given year. This allows 
saturating our baseline specification with firm × year fixed effects. The inclusion of firm × year 
fixed effects implies that following a change in monetary policy, within a year we observe changes 
in bank behavior (the supply side) while controlling for all firm characteristics that remain constant 
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within-year (including unobserved time-varying heterogeneity in firm loan demand). In this 
respect, a complementary level of identification resides in assessing the heterogeneity in lending 
from different banks to the same firm, thus also controlling for loan demand and other annually 
varying firm characteristics. In that sense, we also fully control for annual changes in the 
macroeconomic environment. Any remainder unobserved time-varying macroeconomic elements 
affecting our results should be time-varying within-year (we discuss this below). We also add bank 
fixed effects to account for unobserved, time-invariant bank characteristics affecting loan pricing.  
Next, and given the set of fixed effects, we interact our monetary policy variable with the 
bank capital ratio and firm risk (a triple-interaction term). We focus on the bank capital ratio, as 
this is the bank characteristic with the most significant bearing on the decision to lend (Holmstrom 
and Tirole 1997; Jimenez et al. 2014). Triple interactions control exhaustively for banks’ 
heterogeneous response in supplying credit to riskier firms in times of loose of monetary policy. 
Further, these interaction terms significantly add to the identification power of our model 
(heterogeneous responses), which might be limited due to the use of many fixed effects (especially 
the firm × year fixed effects). 
Based on these empirical identification choices, our model becomes:   
 𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑙𝑓𝑏𝑡 = 𝑎0 + 𝑎1𝑀𝑃𝑡−1  + 𝑎2𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑏,𝑡−1 + 𝑎3𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑓,𝑡−1 +𝑎4𝑀𝑃𝑡−1𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑏,𝑡−1 +  𝑎5𝑀𝑃𝑡−1𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑓,𝑡−1 + 𝑎6𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑏,𝑡−1𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑓,𝑡−1 +𝑎7𝑀𝑃𝑡−1𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑏,𝑡−1𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑓,𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝑋𝑙𝑓𝑏𝑡 + 𝜀𝑙,𝑓,𝑏,𝑡.              (2) 
 
Equation (2) suggests that a loan’s total cost (Loan cost) is a function of monetary policy in quarter 
t-1, measures of bank capital (Capital), firm risk (Firm risk), the double- and triple-interaction 
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terms of these variables, a vector of control variables X (including interaction terms with bank 
capital and firm risk where necessary), and the disturbance ε. Also, the parameter 𝑎0 includes the 
several types of fixed effects discussed earlier. In what follows, we discuss the variables in 
equation (2). 
Our coefficient of interest is 𝑎7, which captures the heterogeneous policy effects of lending 
to risky borrowers ascribed to the heterogeneity in banks’ capitalization. Specifically, a positive 
coefficient 𝑎7 implies more risk-taking (higher loan spreads) from poorly capitalized banks 
lending to riskier firms when MP declines. We estimate equation (2) using OLS. In accordance 
with the focus of our analysis and data variation, we cluster standard errors at the year, bank, and 
firm level.1  
A wrinkle to OLS estimation might come from a special case of selection bias, to the extent 
that the estimated effect of monetary policy on banks’ risk-taking depends on the decision to 
borrow (i.e. whether the variables that determine such an impact are the same as those explaining 
the decision to borrow) (Dass and Massa 2011; Delis et al. 2018). To correct for this bias, we 
conduct a robustness test by employing Heckman’s (1979) two-stage regression technique. The 
first stage is a probit regression of the probability to initiate a new loan (i.e., the dependent variable 
is a dummy that equals 1 in the year when the firm initiates a loan, and 0 otherwise). Then, we 
estimate with OLS the augmented version of equation (1), including Heckman’s (1979) lambda 
from the first-stage probit model. To the extent that the risk-taking channel is a two-step process 
(establish lending relationships and then determine loan terms), the selection model provides 
robust estimates. 
 
                                                 
1
 Our results are robust to clustering only at the bank level, as well as at the bank and firm levels. The chosen three-
way clustering is the most restrictive and produces the most conservative results. 
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2.2. Measures of bank risk-taking and monetary policy 
Loan cost is the all-in-spread drawn (spread over LIBOR plus loan fees) and is an ex ante measure 
of what banks think the riskiness of a borrower is at the time of loan issuance. The literature uses 
loan-pricing variables to identify the risk-taking channel of monetary policy, assuming that profit-
maximizing banks charge higher loan spreads to riskier borrowers (Delis et al. 2017; Paligorova 
and Santos 2017). Further, Loan cost measures new risk by definition (the riskiness of a new loan). 
Part of the literature on syndicated loans also considers other loan fees in banks’ pricing decisions 
(e.g., commitment, utilization, cancellation, and upfront fees) and finds a significant effect of these 
fees in many respects (Berg et al. 2016). Thus, we opt for the measure in Berg et al. (2016), which 
includes all loan fees (where available); we provide a full definition for the construction of our 
variable in Table 1.  
(Please insert Table 1 about here) 
Identifying the monetary policy stance is put to a great test when interest rates approach 
the zero lower bound (ZLB) (Hakkio and Kahn, 2014). From December 2008 to December 2015, 
the federal funds rate was essentially stuck at the ZLB, and the Federal Open Market Committee 
(FOMC) deployed the unconventional tools of forward guidance and quantitative easing. From 
this period onward, most of the relevant empirical literature measures monetary policy with the 
shadow short rate from the yield curve model (Krippner 2016). The shadow rate offers an 
indication of how the Fed’s actions, both conventional and unconventional, influence market 
expectations about monetary policy (rather than being considered to embed all policy actions 
directly). In this respect, the shadow rate is equal to the policy interest rate in non-
ZLB/conventional monetary policy environments (in the pre-financial crisis period), but it can take 
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on negative values in ZLB/unconventional environments (in the post-2008 period). Thus, the 
shadow rate combines data from the ZLB period with data from the non-ZLB period.  
Concerning the exogeneity of the effect of the shadow rate on bank risk, using firm × year 
fixed effects saturates the estimates from annually varying unobserved macroeconomic effects. 
However, there could be within-year variations affecting our estimate on 𝑎7. We have two 
remedies for this problem. The first is to use a full array of quarterly macroeconomic control 
variables in our regressions and do so symmetrically with the monetary policy variable (i.e., 
including the interaction terms with bank capitalization and firm risk). We find that using 
expectations on GDP growth and inflation, as well as the mean Loan cost of the loan facilities by 
quarter, is sufficient in the sense that adding more variables (e.g., consumer and producer 
expectations, stock market volatility indices, etc.) does not affect our results and the additional 
variables have no statistical power.     
Second, we identify (exogenous) monetary policy shocks by estimating Taylor-rule 
residuals (Taylor 1993) from the regression on output gap and inflation. According to Adrian and 
Shin (2008), Taylor rule residuals are discretionary monetary policy. At the same time, they may 
signal the Fed’s intentions to the financial markets, thereby influencing banks’ perceptions about 
the stance of monetary policy (Delis et al. 2017). In other words, banks lend on the basis of whether 
they perceive the federal funds rate (or the shadow short rate after the financial crisis) is lower than 
the rate implied by the Taylor benchmark. 
 
2.3. Measures of bank capital and firm risk 
As indicated in section 2.1, we focus on the triple-interaction term MP× Bank capital × Firm risk 
to assess the compositional changes in the supply of credit at the bank-firm level. Bank capital is 
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the ratio of Tier 1 plus Tier 2 bank capital to total risk-weighted assets. It is widely accepted that 
the relationship between interest rates and bank risk-taking depends on bank capital. Both the risk-
shifting channel of monetary policy and the search-for-yield mechanism are rooted in moral hazard 
problems, which are intuitively more severe for poorly capitalized banks (e.g., Dell’Ariccia et al., 
2017). Therefore, undercapitalized banks are more sensitive to interest rate changes and take 
excessive risks when monetary easing compresses their intermediation margins (Delis and 
Kouretas, 2010; Jimenez et al., 2014; Ioannidou et al., 2015).  
Firm risk is Altman’s (1968) inverse modified Z-score, with higher values implying a 
riskier firm. The Z-score is widely used to measure firm risk because it uses multiple variables to 
measure the financial health and creditworthiness of a borrower. We do not include other firm-
year characteristics as controls, because the inclusion of firm × year fixed effects renders these 
redundant. 
 
2.4. Control variables 
Sufi (2007) and Ivashina (2009) identify adverse selection and moral hazard specifically in the 
syndicated loans market. Adverse selection occurs before loan syndication because the lead bank 
has an incentive to originate high-risk loans in order to nurture a relationship with the borrower 
and/or to reap underwriting fees. Moral hazard arises after syndication, when the lead arranger 
puts less effort into monitoring, especially when it retains a smaller loan portion. Both agency 
problems suggest that syndicate participants may demand higher loan spreads as compensation for 
the risk of wrongdoing by the lead bank.  
To account for these agency problems, we include a set of loan controls and lead-bank 
characteristics. Specifically, loan controls include loan amount, time to maturity, number of 
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lenders in the syndicate, the requirement of performance and collateral provisions, and the use of 
financial and other covenants.2 The first three variables are continuously quantifiable, but the 
remaining variables are qualitative in nature (i.e., they indicate the presence of any provision or 
covenant assigned to the loan).  
 We also use loan-type fixed effects, which are very important, as loan facilities include 
credit lines and term loans; they have fundamental differences in their contractual arrangements 
and pricing (Berg et al. 2016). For example, term loans usually do not include several types of 
fees, and some are structured to appeal more to institutional investors rather than banks.3 Further, 
we include loan purpose fixed effects. 
Finally, bank controls measure the lead lenders’ financial soundness and include liquidity, 
nonperforming loans, size, and return on assets (ROA). We expect that these variables saturate the 
effect of the triple-interaction terms from other supply-side characteristics. 
(Please insert Table 1 about here) 
 
2.5. Summary statistics 
Table 2 reports summary statistics for the variables used in our empirical analysis. The average 
cost of loans is 235.43 basis points over LIBOR, with a standard deviation of 123.25, reflecting 
the fact that our sample covers syndicated loans to firms of various risk levels. The average 
syndicated loan facility is approximately $156 million, with a loan maturity of 52 months and 12 
lenders.  
                                                 
2
 In robustness checks, we show that our findings are not subject to a bad controls problem. 
3
 We find that the loan-type fixed effects are sufficient to control for the heterogeneity between term loans and credit 
lines. In unreported robustness tests, we estimate our models separately for term loans and credit lines. We find that 
the risk-taking channel is somewhat stronger for credit lines (as expected) but remains statistically significant also in 
the sample of term loans. 
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 The lead arrangers have a capital ratio of 12.2% on average, but the dispersion is 
significant, with a standard deviation of 6%. Lead banks do not significantly vary in size (as 
indicated by the relatively small standard deviation) and are on average profitable (with an average 
ROA equal to 1%), albeit the variation in pretax profits to total assets is substantial (2.2%).  
The average borrowing firm in our sample is leveraged around 37% of its total assets and 
is profitable (the average ROA equals 2.4%), but the variation is large. The average (inverse) Z-
score is 1.59 with a high degree of variation across firms, reflecting significant differences in credit 
risk. In addition, it appears that most syndicated loans are deals between borrowers and lead banks 
without a recent prior relationship. 
 The shadow rate also displays substantial variation over the sample period, averaging 
2.53% but with a standard deviation of 3%. Finally, about one-fifth of quarters in the sample 
correspond to ZLB/unconventional monetary policy periods. 
 (Please insert Table 2 about here) 
 
2.6. Analysis by industry 
We offer insight on the potency of the risk-taking channel by industry. As risk varies among 
industries, we expect to find cross-industry heterogeneous responses to the risk-taking channel of 
monetary policy. We distinguish between different industries using Standard Industrial 
Classification (SIC) codes. The syndicated loans for agriculture, forestry, and fishing firms are 
very few; thus, we exclude this group. SIC codes from 1000 to 1799 are for firms in the mining & 
construction industries (codes from 1800 to 1999 are not used). Codes from 2000 to 3999 represent 
the manufacturing industry; 4000 to 4999 transportation, communications, electric, gas, and 
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sanitary services; 5000 to 5999 trade (wholesale and retail); 6000 to 6999 finance; and 7000-8999 
services. 
 Table A1 in the Appendix provides summary statistics for key loan features (cost of loans, 
loan amount, and maturity) by industry. Manufacturing and service companies face on average the 
highest funding costs (255.57 and 254.88 basis points over LIBOR, respectively), while finance 
companies pay the lowest spreads (203.71 basis points over LIBOR). Loans also vary significantly 
in maturity, ranging from 34.47 months (finance sector) to 51.22 months (transportation & utilities 
sector), indicating cross-industry differences in financing horizons. In contrast, the variation in 
average loan amount is relatively small across industries.  
As expected, the financial sector stands out when comparing leverage ratios (0.42); 
however, this is also a sector that by nature has alternative sources of financing (from internal 
capital to central bank facilities). The manufacturing and mining & construction sectors also report 
high leverage ratios (0.39 and 0.38, respectively), reflecting high investment needs in machinery 
and other assets, as well as their relative riskiness. 
 
3. Estimation results 
3.1. Results from the full sample 
We first identify the risk-taking channel in our full sample, following the paradigm of previous 
literature (Delis et al. 2017; Paligorova and Santos 2017). Table 3 reports the results. We include 
only the coefficient estimates on the triple interactions, as these are the important estimates for 
identification purposes. Importantly, we report the marginal effect in basis points of a one-
percentage-point decrease in MP for firms with mean inverse Z-scores and banks with mean 
capital.  
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(Please insert Table 3 about here) 
The effect of our control variables (not reported due to space considerations, but available 
on request) is fully in line with expectations and the associated literature (e.g., Delis et al. 2018; 
Hasan et al. 2014; Bae and Goyal 2009; Sufi 2007). Consistent with the estimation of a reduced 
form loan demand and supply equation, Loan amount bears a negative and statistically significant 
coefficient. Collateral has a positive effect, reflecting riskier loans, whereas covenants and 
Performance provisions have negative coefficients reflecting the tradeoff between higher loan 
spreads and more stringent covenants. The effect of the number of lenders is also positive, 
consistent with the premise that more lenders are involved in high-risk loans. 
 The firm × year fixed effects absorb the main terms of firm characteristics. The marginal 
effect of the inverse Z-score is positive and significant, showing that riskier firms borrow at higher 
cost. The coefficient on bank characteristics is also in line with expectations. For example, the 
marginal effect of bank capital is positive and statistically significant, showing that better 
capitalized banks originate riskier loans. This is a standard moral-hazard argument, consistent with 
previous studies of the syndicated loan market (Iosifidi and Kokas, 2015).          
The triple-interaction term carries a positive and statistically significant (at the 5% level) 
coefficient, suggesting that lower short-term rates strongly encourage risk-taking among poorly 
capitalized banks. In other words, loose monetary policy incentivizes poorly capitalized banks to 
ease riskier firms’ access to credit, albeit at a higher cost. Specifically, the estimated marginal 
effect in column 1 indicates that a one-percentage-point decline in the shadow rate increases the 
cost of credit by 25 basis points. This is economically significant, as it represents more than 20% 
of the standard deviation of Cost of loans (123.25).4 Given the average syndicated loan size ($156 
                                                 
4
 We also experiment with alternative measures of firm risk and manifestations of bank agency problems. Specifically, 
in Table A2 in the Appendix we interact Shadow rate with Bank capital and Firm leverage (instead of the Z-score), 
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million), the total cost of borrowing among risky firms rises by $0.39 million (=$156.000.000 x 
25 basis points) per year on average when the shadow rate declines by one percentage point. 
Considering that the average time to maturity for syndicated loans is 4.4 years, this represents 
approximately $1.7 million in extra interest expense over the loan’s duration.  
In column 2 we drop bank controls and include bank × year fixed effects to account for 
time-varying bank heterogeneity. In this case, we obtain identification from comparing changes in 
bank lending during the same quarter to firms with different levels of creditworthiness. The triple-
interaction term continues to exert a statistically significant, positive impact on loan cost. The 
estimated marginal effect actually increases in size by 1.8 basis points.  
Next, we correct for the selection bias using Heckman’s lambda and saturate progressively 
with firm × year and bank × year fixed effects to account for all time-varying observed and 
unobserved firm and bank heterogeneity (columns 3 and 4). The first-stage probit results indicate 
that poorly capitalized banks are more likely to lend to riskier firms in times of loose monetary 
policy. The second-stage results verify the presence of the risk-taking channel, as the coefficient 
on the triple-interaction term retains its sign and statistical and economic significance. In addition, 
lambda carries significant positive estimates, implying that selection bias exists and thus we should 
appropriately account for it. 5   
[Insert Table 3 around here] 
                                                 
where Firm leverage is the ratio of a firm’s total debt to its total assets. The estimated positive coefficients on the 
triple-interaction terms provide evidence (at the 5% significance level) of the presence of the risk-taking channel for 
both the whole sample and for firms in the mining-construction and manufacturing sectors. In Table A3, we use Bank 
liquidity (instead of Bank capital) to account for bank agency problems and obtain similar results: banks resort to 
excessive risky lending to mining & construction and manufacturing firms when faced with liquidity shortages.      
5
 In Table A4 in the Appendix, we also account for a special version of selection bias, namely a bad controls problem. 
Specifically, we investigate whether loan characteristics (described in Table 1) are bad controls in that they might as 
well be dependent variables in our empirical specifications (Angrist and Pischke, 2009). The results indicate that 
including quantitative loan variables (column 1), qualitative loan characteristics (column 2), or both (column 3) does 
not significantly alter the estimated marginal effect of a 1% decrease in the monetary policy rate on loan cost. We 
obtain similar findings when employing Heckman’s two-step correction (columns 4 – 6).   
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3.2. Results by industry 
In this section, we examine the potency of the risk-taking channel by industry. We estimate all 
specifications in Table 4 using OLS and include the same set of right-hand-side variables as in 
column 1 of Table 3. Focusing on the triple-interaction terms, we observe that the coefficient is 
highly significant in the mining & construction sector and the manufacturing sector. The estimated 
marginal effects of a one-percentage-point decline in our monetary policy variable on the cost of 
credit are significantly larger (29.7 and 30 basis points, respectively) compared with the estimates 
for the full sample in Table 3. In the remaining sectors, the effect is either weaker (in descending 
order: trade, services, and transportation & utilities) or insignificant (finance).  
Importantly, these results hold even after controlling for selection bias using Heckman’s 
model (Table 5). The first-stage probit results are similar to those in the full sample across all 
industries: poorly capitalized banks are more likely to lend to riskier firms in times of loose 
monetary policy. Although banks with more agency problems lend more to riskier firms when 
monetary policy is loose, their actions are consistent with excessive risk-taking mainly in the 
mining & construction and manufacturing industries.  
[Insert Tables 4 and 5 around here] 
We conduct several robustness tests on these results. In Table 6 we use Taylor rule residuals 
as monetary policy shocks (instead of the shadow rate) and find strong evidence in favor of the 
risk-taking channel both in the whole sample of firms (column 7) and in the industry subsamples 
of columns 1 (mining & construction) and 2 (manufacturing). Furthermore, these industry-level 
effects are even larger in magnitude than the corresponding ones in Tables 4 and 5. For instance, 
the estimated marginal effect of a 1% decline in Taylor rule residuals on loan pricing equals 34.5 
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basis points in column 7, which corresponds to approximately 28% of the standard deviation of 
loan cost. The stronger risk-taking effect in Table 6 suggests that banks tend to assess the future 
path of monetary policy and formulate accordingly their risk-taking behavior based on observed 
monetary conditions such as the ones incorporated in the standard Taylor rule (i.e. output gap and 
inflation).  
[Insert Table 6 around here] 
Next, we examine whether the documented effects are different during periods of 
conventional monetary policy. Therefore, we run a series of regressions focusing on the pre-
financial crisis period (i.e., up to 2007) and present the results in Table 7. Importantly, the 
estimated coefficients on the triple-interaction terms remain positive and statistically significant 
for the full sample, as well as for the mining & construction and manufacturing sectors (as in 
Tables 3 and 4). The marginal effect of monetary policy shocks on loan costs is somewhat larger 
for the full sample (28.8 instead of 25 basis points reported in Table 3), and the manufacturing 
sector seems to drive this increase (33.2 instead of 30 basis points reported in Table 4). This finding 
implies that the adoption of unconventional monetary policy actions in the post-2008 period has 
not significantly altered banks’ risky lending decisions.    
[Insert Table 7 around here]   
Summing up, the results so far show that regardless of the estimation approach, there is 
strong evidence of a risk-taking channel for the U.S. economy as a whole with a stronger effect in 
the mining & construction and manufacturing sectors. The natural question that follows is why 
these industries are riskier borrowers in times of loose monetary policy, thereby attracting the risk-
taking appetite of undercapitalized banks.  
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The existing literature provides only fragmented insights on this matter. Leamer (2007) 
argues that both construction and (durable) manufacturing firms face intertemporal production 
decisions in the sense that previous production creates assets that compete with current production. 
Therefore, low interest rates tend to lead to unsustainably high levels of output, inevitably followed 
by long periods of low levels of output to bring the stock back to equilibrium. In other words, 
monetary policy affects mostly the timing of production in these sectors rather than total volume 
of production. Consequently, risk in these sectors stems from the fact that booms do not simply 
precede busts, but rather cause them.6  
Willis and Cao (2015) identify another source of idiosyncratic risk. They argue that mining 
& construction and manufacturing are the most interest-sensitive industries in the U.S. economy. 
Thus, in times of easing monetary policy, firms in these sectors tend to activate previously planned, 
big, long-term projects (such as building or buying factories and equipment or purchasing land), 
and they expose themselves to greater risks.7  
Although, the aforementioned propositions point primarily to credit demand effects, they 
also relate to the risk-taking channel to the extent that poorly capitalized banks allocate credit to 
riskier borrowers. Our strategy to further disentangle supply from demand effects and identify the 
pure risk-taking channel is as follows: if (undercapitalized) banks lend more to mining & 
construction and manufacturing firms because of their higher idiosyncratic risk, our measure of 
the risk-taking channel (i.e., the triple interaction of shadow rate, bank capital, and firm risk) 
should retain its sign and economic significance in a regression that exhaustively controls for loan 
                                                 
6
 This is close in spirit to the concept of financial cycle, which can be a sequence of "self-reinforcing interactions 
between perceptions of value and risk, attitudes towards risk and financing constraints, which translate into booms 
followed by busts” (Borio 2014). 
7
 Other sectors, such as the financial and services sectors, typically do not undertake long-term projects that are 
sensitive to interest rate changes. 
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conditions associated with an increase in credit demand. For instance, higher demand from 
nonprime borrowers may lead banks to reduce credit, demand more performance provisions or 
covenants, and/or shorten maturities in an attempt to mitigate their exposure to liquidity risk. 
Therefore, we augment equation (2) with triple interactions of bank capital, firm risk, and 
quantitative/qualitative loan characteristics, and we report the results in Tables 8 and 9, 
respectively.  
Two key insights emerge from this exercise. First, we observe that the triple interaction 
shadow rate × bank capital × firm risk is positive and statistically significant (at the 5% level or 
better) in mining & construction and manufacturing sectors. The estimated marginal effects are 
slightly lower than those in Table 4 but they do retain their economic relevancy. Second, the 
estimated coefficients on the additional triples suggest that undercapitalized banks tighten loan 
conditions when monetary policy is loose and the potential pool of borrowers (or projects) is larger 
and riskier by shortening maturities (columns 1 and 2 of Table 8) and adding performance-pricing 
provisions (column 1 of Table 9). These findings are in line with Strahan (1999), who documents 
that banks use price and nonprice terms as complements in dealing with borrower risk and that 
observably riskier firms face tighter nonprice terms in their loan contracts. Furthermore, and more 
important in the context of the present study, these findings suggest the potency of a pure credit 
risk-taking channel in the mining & construction and manufacturing sectors after controlling for 
adjustments in loan conditions stemming from higher loan demand by riskier borrowers in these 
sectors and the concomitant liquidity risk.  
[Insert Tables 8 and 9 around here] 
 
3.3. Real effects of industry heterogeneity in the potency of the risk-taking channel   
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Do the identified asymmetries in the potency of the risk-taking channel have real implications? To 
answer this question, we examine how the risk-taking channel affects borrowers’ future 
performance, as measured by Tobin’s q and return on assets (ROA). Specifically, we regress firm 
performance (at time t+1) on the predicted cost of loans (at time t) from the partial prediction of 
loan cost to the shadow rate. If there is no effect on firm performance in the face of bank risk-
taking channel shocks, then the estimated coefficient on the predicted cost of loans should be 
statistically insignificant.  
We first report the results of this exercise for the full sample of firms and for all years 
(column 1 of Table 10). We find that for both dependent variables, an increase in predicted loan 
cost significantly decreases firm performance in the following year. For instance, the estimate of 
-0.246 in column 1 of panel A implies that a 1% increase in loan cost leads to a decline in Tobin’s 
q of 0.246, which is about 26% of its standard deviation. Thus, lax lending standards lead to 
significant negative performance effects at the firm level.  
Columns 2-4 of Table 10 repeat the analysis for specific subperiods. Interestingly, while 
predicted loan costs remain negative and highly statistically significant in the precrisis period 
(2002-2006), there is weaker evidence of performance effects in the postcrisis period (2010-2018), 
indicating that the amplification effect is asymmetric on the real side. Thus, adopting 
unconventional monetary policies during and after the 2007-2008 financial crisis weakens the 
negative real effects by softening credit terms. This might stem from the fact that unconventional 
monetary policy announcements (e.g., Fed announcements for large-scale purchases of long-term 
assets) represent a type of information shock whose impact on the real economy is highly 
questionable (Chen et al. 2012; Jawadi et al. 2017) and potentially against corrective monetary 
policy in the short run (Nakamura and Steinsson 2018).  
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Most important, we examine whether specific industries drive these findings. In particular, 
we run the same regression as in Table 10 for the six industrial sectors and report the results in 
Table 11. The estimated negative coefficients on the predicted cost of loans suggest that credit 
supply booms and the concomitant increased risk-taking capacity of U.S. banks exert significant 
deteriorating effects on the mining & construction, manufacturing, and, to a lesser extent, services 
sectors. These are precisely the sectors that the risk-taking channel mostly affects, as per our 
previous analysis. Thus, industry asymmetries in the transmission of the risk-taking channel cause 
asymmetries in the relative performance of different sectors post-loan origination.  
This is an important result, highlighting that monetary policy can have varying economic 
implications for different industries, at least in the short run. The performance effects seem 
especially damaging in sectors that exhibit high variation in growth opportunities, as measured by 
the standard deviation of their Tobin’s q (see Table A1 in the appendix). The explanation is that 
higher growth variability in these sectors may be attractive to risk-seeking banks because of the 
potential for higher returns. This is consistent with Borio and Zhu (2012), who argue that risk 
tolerance increases with wealth. Because sectors with highly variable growth prospects experience 
significant increases in asset and collateral values, as well as in income and profits in prolonged 
expansionary monetary periods, banks lower their risk perceptions and/or increase their risk 
tolerance. Greater credit availability, however, may affect the financial behavior of economic 
agents. Specifically, according to the free cash flow hypothesis (Jensen 1986), liquidity abundance 
incentivizes firm managers to overinvest (i.e., to invest in projects with negative net present value) 
in order to increase the resources under their control. In other words, firm managers have both the 
incentive and the opportunity to make potentially wasteful investments, thereby triggering a 
problem of corporate overinvestment that damages firm performance and value. 
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 [Insert Tables 10 and 11 around here] 
 
4. Concluding remarks 
Conventional and unconventional monetary policy easing has produced considerable research on 
how these policies affect bank risk-taking. In this paper, we use loan-level data on newly 
syndicated loans and assess the potency of monetary policy’s risk-taking channel across different 
industries. We report three main findings.  
First, we find robust evidence of the risk-taking channel in the U.S. economy over 1984 – 
2018. Our baseline empirical results show that a 1% decline in the shadow rate results in an 
increase of 25 basis points in risk premium on new loans to riskier borrowers. Moreover, consistent 
with the risk-shifting and search-for-yield channels, we find that this effect is more pronounced 
for poorly capitalized banks. Second, and most important, we document that the risk-taking 
channel exhibits significant heterogeneity across industries, though the mining & construction and 
manufacturing sectors are the most affected and the financial sector is the least affected. Third, 
this asymmetric potency of the risk-taking channel yields performance differences: we find that 
the higher cost of credit yields lower firm performance in the most-affected industries, especially 
in times of conventional monetary policy (aka, before the subprime crisis).  
Our results are practical for monetary policy implementation and can help central banks 
better understand the multidimensional aspects and heterogeneous strength of the bank risk-taking 
channel on the real economy. An important implication emerging from our results is that central 
banks should consider whether the asymmetric real implications of the risk-taking channel by 
industry call for fine-tuning unconventional monetary policy tools to level the field for credit costs 
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across industries (e.g., credit easing in vulnerable sectors). This should especially be the case if 
higher credit cost is not due to inefficiencies but due to the inherently risky nature of the industries.  
 
  
 26 
 
References 
Acharya, V., & Naqvi, H. (2012). The seeds of a crisis: A theory of bank liquidity and risk taking 
over the business cycle. Journal of Financial Economics, 106(2), 349-366. 
Adrian, T., & Shin, H. S. (2008). Liquidity, monetary policy, and financial cycles. Current issues 
in economics and finance, 14(1). 
Afanasyeva, E., & Güntner, J. (2019). Bank market power and the risk channel of monetary 
policy. Journal of Monetary Economics (in press). 
Altman, E. I. (1968). Financial ratios, discriminant analysis and the prediction of corporate 
bankruptcy. The Journal of Finance, 23(4), 589-609. 
Altunbas, Y., Gambacorta, L., & Marqués-Ibañez D. (2014). Does monetary policy affect bank 
risk taking?. International Journal of Central Banking, 10, 95–135. 
Angeloni, I., Faia, E., & Duca, M. L. (2015). Monetary policy and risk taking. Journal of Economic 
Dynamics and Control, 52, 285-307. 
Angrist, J. D., & Pischke, J. S. (2009). Mostly Harmless Econometrics: An Empiricist's 
Companion, Princeton University Press. 
Bae, K. H., & Goyal, V. K. (2009). Creditor rights, enforcement, and bank loans. The Journal of 
Finance, 64(2), 823-860. 
Berg, T., Saunders, A., & Steffen, S. (2016). The total cost of corporate borrowing in the loan 
market: Don't ignore the fees. The Journal of Finance 71(3), 1357-1392. 
Borio, C. (2014). The financial cycle and macroeconomics: What have we learnt?. Journal of 
Banking & Finance, 45, 182-198. 
Borio, C., & Zhu, H. (2012). Capital regulation, risk-taking and monetary policy: a missing link 
in the transmission mechanism?. Journal of Financial stability, 8(4), 236-251. 
Buch, C. M., Eickmeier, S., & Prieto, E. (2014). In search for yield? Survey-based evidence on 
bank risk taking. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 43, 12-30. 
Chen, H., Cúrdia, V., & Ferrero, A. (2012). The macroeconomic effects of large‐scale asset 
purchase programmes. The Economic Journal, 122(564), F289-F315. 
Colletaz, G., Levieuge, G., & Popescu, A. (2018). Monetary policy and long-run systemic risk-
taking. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 86, 165-184. 
 27 
 
Dass, N., Massa, M. (2011). The impact of a strong bank-firm relationship on the borrowing firm. 
The Review of Financial Studies, 24(4), 1204-1260. 
De Nicolò, G., Dell'Ariccia, G., Laeven, L., & Valencia, F. (2010). Monetary Policy and Bank 
Risk Taking. IMF Staff Position Note SPN/10/09. 
Delis, M. D., & Kouretas G. P. (2011). Interest Rates and Bank Risk Taking. Journal of Banking 
& Finance, 35, 840–55. 
Delis, M. D., Hasan, I., & Mylonidis, N. (2017). The risk‐taking channel of monetary policy in the 
US: Evidence from corporate loan data. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 49(1), 187-
213. 
Delis, M. D., Politsidis, P. N., & Sarno, L. (2018). Foreign currency lending. Available at SSRN 
3220260. 
Dell'Ariccia, G., Laeven, L., & Suarez, G. A. (2017). Bank leverage and monetary policy's risk‐
taking channel: evidence from the United States. The Journal of Finance, 72(2), 613-654. 
Dubecq, S., Mojon, B., & Ragot, X. (2009). Fuzzy capital requirements, risk-shifting and the risk 
taking channel of monetary policy. Banque de France Working Papers, 254. 
Hakkio, C. S., & Kahn, G. A. (2014). Evaluating monetary policy at the zero lower 
bound. Technical Report Q II, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City. 
Hasan, I., Hoi, C.K., Wu, Q., & Zhang, H. (2014). Beauty is in the eye of the beholder: The effect 
of corporate tax avoidance on the cost of bank loans. Journal of Financial Economics 113(1), 
109-130. 
Heckman, J. J. (1979). Sample selection bias as a specification error. Econometrica, 47(1), 153-
161. 
Holmstrom, B., & Tirole, J. (1997). Financial intermediation, loanable funds, and the real 
sector. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112(3), 663-691. 
Ioannidou, V., Ongena, S., & Peydró, J. L. (2015). Monetary policy, risk-taking, and pricing: 
Evidence from a quasi-natural experiment. Review of Finance, 19(1), 95-144. 
Iosifidi, M., & Kokas, S. (2015). Who lends to riskier and lower-profitability firms? Evidence 
from the syndicated loan market. Journal of Banking & Finance, 61, S14-S21. 
Ivashina, V. (2009). Asymmetric information effects on loan spreads. Journal of Financial 
Economics, 92(2), 300-319. 
 28 
 
Jawadi, F., Sousa, R. M., & Traverso, R. (2017). On the macroeconomic and wealth effects of 
unconventional monetary policy. Macroeconomic Dynamics, 21(5), 1189-1204. 
Jensen, M. C. (1986). Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance, and takeovers. The 
American economic review, 76(2), 323-329. 
Jiménez, G., Ongena, S., Peydró, J. L., & Saurina, J. (2014). Hazardous times for monetary policy: 
What do twenty‐three million bank loans say about the effects of monetary policy on credit 
risk‐taking?. Econometrica, 82(2), 463-505. 
Krippner, L. (2016). Documentation for measures of monetary policy. Reserve Bank of New 
Zealand. Wellington, New Zealand. 
Leamer, E. E. (2007). Housing is the business cycle. NBER Working Paper Series No. 13428. 
Maddaloni, A., & Peydró, J. L. (2011). Bank risk-taking, securitization, supervision, and low 
interest rates: Evidence from the Euro-area and the US lending standards. The Review of 
Financial Studies, 24(6), 2121-2165. 
Nakamura, E., & Steinsson, J. (2018). High-frequency identification of monetary non-neutrality: 
the information effect. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 133(3), 1283-1330. 
Paligorova, T., & Santos, J. A. (2017). Monetary policy and bank risk-taking: Evidence from the 
corporate loan market. Journal of Financial Intermediation, 30, 35-49. 
Rajan, R. G. (2005). Has Financial Development Made the World Riskier?. NBER Working Paper 
Series No. 11728. 
Strahan, P. E. (1999). Borrower risk and the price and nonprice terms of bank loans. FRB of New 
York staff report, (90). 
Sufi, A. (2007). Information asymmetry and financing arrangements: Evidence from syndicated 
loans. The Journal of Finance, 62(2), 629-668. 
Taylor, J. B. (1993). Discretion versus policy rules in practice. In Carnegie-Rochester Conference 
Series on Public Policy, 39, 195-214.  
Valencia, F. (2014). Monetary policy, bank leverage, and financial stability. Journal of Economic 
Dynamics and Control, 47, 20-38. 
Willis, J. L., & Cao, G. (2015). Has the US economy become less interest rate 
sensitive?. Economic Review Q II 5–36. 
 29 
 
Table 1. Variable definitions 
Variable Definition 
Cost of loans For term loans:  
Total cost of borrowing = Upfront Fee / Loan Maturity in Years + (Facility Fee + Spread) + 
Prob(Utilization>Utilization Threshold | Usage > 0) x Utilization Fee + Prob(Cancellation) x 
Cancellation Fee    
 
For revolvers without letter of credit:  
Total cost of borrowing = Upfront Fee / Loan Maturity in Years + (1-PDD) x (Facility Fee + 
Commitment Fee) + PDD x (Facility Fee + Spread) + PDD x Prob(Utilization>Utilization 
Threshold | Usage > 0) x Utilization Fee + Prob(Cancellation) x Cancellation Fee  
 
where PDD is the likelihood that the credit line is drawn down; Prob(Utilization>Utilization 
Threshold | Usage > 0) is the probability that the utilization of the credit line is higher than the 
thresholds specified in the loan contract conditional on observing utilization. 
Prob(Cancellation) is the probability that the loan is going to be cancelled. 
 
We follow the program/code in the website of Berg, Saunders and Steffen (2016) to calculate 
the measure.  
 
Shadow rate The quarterly shadow short rate (estimates from Krippner, 2016).  
Taylor residuals The residuals of the regression of the shadow short rate on output gap and inflation. 
Loan initiation Dummy equal to one for the firm-years a loan is initiated, zero otherwise. 
Bank capital  The ratio of Tier 1 + Tier 2 bank capital to total risk-weighted assets. 
Bank liquidity  The ratio of liquid assets (cash and short-term securities) to total assets.  
Non-performing loans The ratio of a bank’s non-performing loans (90 days) to total loans. 
Bank size  The natural logarithm of a bank’s total assets. 
Bank ROA The ratio of a bank’s pre-tax profits to total assets. 
Firm inverse Z-score  Modified Altman’s (1968) Z-score ( = (1.2*working capital + 1.4*retained earnings + 
3.3*EBIT + 0.999*sales)/total assets). We multiply the Z-score with -1, so that a higher value 
reflects a more risky firm. 
Firm leverage The ratio of a firm’s total debt to the firm’s total assets. 
Firm Tobin’s q Calculated as (Equity market value + Liabilities book value)/(Equity book value + Liabilities 
book value). 
Firm ROA The ratio of a firm’s pre-tax profit to total assets. 
Firm current ratio The ratio of current assets to current liabilities. 
Firm cash flow The ratio of cash flow to total sales. 
Firm size The natural logarithm of total assets. 
Firm inefficiency The ratio of cost of goods sold to total sales. 
Loan amount  Log of the loan facility amount in U.S. dollars. 
Loan maturity  Loan duration in months. 
Number of lenders The number of banks involved in the syndicated loan. 
Collateral  Dummy equal to one if the loan is secured with collateral, zero otherwise. 
Performance provisions Dummy equal to one if the loan has performance pricing provisions, zero otherwise. 
Financial covenants The number of financial covenants in the loan contract. 
Other covenants Dummy equal to one if the loan has other covenants (besides financial covenants), zero 
otherwise. 
Bank-firm relationship The number of loan deals between a bank and a firm in the five years prior to the current loan 
deal. 
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Table 2. Summary statistics 
The table reports summary statistics (mean, standard deviation, minimum 
and maximum) for the sample used in our baseline regressions. The number 
of observations is 103,725. These observations correspond to lead banks 
involved in syndicated loan deals. 
 
Mean Std. dev. Min. Max. 
Cost of loans 235.43 123.25 2.100 1,100 
Shadow rate 2.529 3.011 -2.922 11.390 
Taylor residuals -1.313 2.716 -6.450 6.774 
Loan initiation 0.207 0.410 0 1 
Bank capital  12.203 6.014 0.004 63.173 
Bank liquidity  5.031 0.092 0.000 0.857 
Non-performing loans 0.020 0.023 0.000 0.376 
Bank size  12.028 1.529 4.843 19.545 
Bank ROA 0.010 0.022 -0.019 0.523 
Firm Z-score  1.590 1.465 -3.205 14.999 
Firm leverage 0.368 0.517 0.000 126.71 
Firm Tobin’s q 1.540 1.335 0.155 9.994 
Firm ROA 0.024 0.096 -0.599 0.337 
Firm current ratio 2.148 2.167 0.273 30.480 
Firm cash flow 9.380 24.321 -53.180 211.32 
Firm size 13.021 3.170 5.407 19.255 
Firm inefficiency 44.180 22.152 0.928 511.13 
Loan amount  18.867 1.581 9.18 24.635 
Loan maturity  42.299 30.136 3 1,020 
Number of lenders 12.283 14.968 1 290 
Collateral  0.414 0.492 0 1 
Performance provisions 0.280 0.449 0 1 
Financial covenants 0.818 1.294 0 8 
Other covenants 0.099 0.299 0 1 
Bank-firm relationship 0.302 1.470 0 80 
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Table 3. Identifying the risk-taking channel in the full sample  
The table reports coefficient estimates and standard errors (in parentheses) clustered by bank, firm, and year. 
Dependent variable is Cost of loans. Specifications (1) and (2) report the results from the estimation of equation (1) 
using OLS; specifications (3) and (4) report the results from the estimation of equations (2) and (3) using Heckman’s 
model. The dependent variable in the first-stage of Heckman’s model is Loan initiation. Marginal effect is the 
impact (in basis points) of a 1 pp decrease in the monetary policy variable for the firm with the mean soundness 
and the bank with a mean capital. The lower part of the table reports the control variables and the fixed effects used 
in each specification. The bank controls include Bank liquidity, Non-performing loans, Bank size, and Bank ROA. 
The loan controls include Loan amount, Loan maturity, Number of lenders, Collateral, Performance provisions, 
Financial covenants, Other covenants. Definitions for all variables are in Table 1 and summary statistics in Table 
2. The ** denote statistical significance at the 5% level.    
 OLS model Heckman’s model 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Shadow rate × Bank capital 
× Firm risk 
1.286** 1.381** 1.347** 1.399** 
(0.581) (0.602) (0.584) (0.606) 
Marginal effect 25.0 26.8 26.1 27.1 
First stage     
Shadow rate × Bank capital 
× Firm risk 
  -5.430** -5.742** 
  (2.107) (2.203) 
Observations 88,436 87,538 88,436 87,538 
Adjusted R-squared 0.883 0.882   
Bank controls Y N Y N 
Loan controls Y Y Y Y 
Loan type effects Y Y Y Y 
Loan purpose effects Y Y Y Y 
Firm effects N N N N 
Bank effects Y N Y N 
Firm × year effects Y Y Y Y 
Bank × year effects N Y N Y 
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Table 4. Identifying the risk-taking channel by industry: OLS regressions 
The table reports coefficient estimates and standard errors (in parentheses) clustered by bank, firm, and year. Dependent 
variable is Cost of loans. All specifications are estimated using OLS on equation (1). Marginal effect is the impact (in 
basis points) of a 1 pp decrease in the monetary policy variable for the firm with the mean soundness and the bank with 
a mean capital. The lower part of the table reports the control variables and the fixed effects used in each specification. 
The bank controls include Bank liquidity, Non-performing loans, Bank size, and Bank ROA. The loan controls include 
Loan amount, Loan maturity, Number of lenders, Collateral, Performance provisions, Financial covenants, Other 
covenants. Definitions for all variables are in Table 1 and summary statistics in Table 2. The ***, **, and * marks denote 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.       
 
  
(1) 
Mining & 
construction 
(2) 
Manufacturing 
(3) 
Transportation 
& utilities 
(4) 
Trade 
(5)  
Finance 
(6) 
Services 
Shadow rate × Bank 
capital × Firm risk 
1.532*** 1.544** 0.979* 1.498* 0.582 1.443* 
(0.470) (0.643) (0.531) (0.802) (0.837) (0.801) 
Marginal effect 29.7 30.0 16.0 25.1 11.3 24.0 
Observations 5,630 27,965 14,780 10,752 13,883 15,426 
Adjusted R-squared 0.844 0.871 0.905 0.844 0.931 0.874 
Bank controls Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Loan controls Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Loan type effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Loan purpose effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Bank effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Firm × year effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
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Table 5. Identifying the risk-taking channel by industry: Heckman regressions 
The table reports coefficient estimates and standard errors (in parentheses) clustered by bank, firm, and year. Dependent 
variable is Cost of loans. All specifications are estimated using Heckman’s model on equations (1) and (2). Marginal 
effect is the impact (in basis points) of a 1 pp decrease in the monetary policy variable for the firm with the mean 
soundness and the bank with a mean capital. The lower part of the table reports the control variables and the fixed effects 
used in each specification. The bank controls include Bank liquidity, Non-performing loans, Bank size, and Bank ROA. 
The loan controls include Loan amount, Loan maturity, Number of lenders, Collateral, Performance provisions, 
Financial covenants, Other covenants. Definitions for all variables are in Table 1 and summary statistics in Table 2. The 
***, **, and * marks denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.       
 
  
(1) 
Mining & 
construction 
(2) 
Manufacturing 
(3) 
Transportation 
& utilities 
(4) 
Trade 
(5)  
Finance 
(6) 
Services 
Shadow rate × Bank 
capital × Firm risk 
1.555*** 1.578** 0.949* 1.449 0.174 1.374* 
(0.488) (0.656) (0.487) (0.884) (0.474) (0.804) 
Marginal effect 30.2 30.6 15.4 24.1 3.4 24.7 
First stage       
Shadow rate × Bank 
capital × Firm risk 
-6.110** -5.830** -5.207** -5.449** -4.120* -5.120*** 
(2.428) (2.344) (2.094) (2.256) (2.780) (1.880) 
Observations 5,630 27,965 14,780 10,752 13,883 15,426 
Bank controls Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Loan controls Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Loan type effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Loan purpose effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Bank effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Firm × year effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
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Table 6. Using Taylor residuals as the monetary policy variable 
The table reports coefficient estimates and standard errors (in parentheses) clustered by bank, firm, and year. Dependent variable 
is Cost of loans. The monetary policy variable is the Taylor residuals obtained from regressing the Shadow rate on output gap and 
inflation in the period 1960Q1-2016Q4. All specifications are estimated using OLS on equation (1). Marginal effect is the impact 
(in basis points) of a 1 pp decrease in the monetary policy variable for the firm with the mean soundness and the bank with a mean 
capital. The lower part of the table reports the control variables and the fixed effects used in each specification. The bank controls 
include Bank liquidity, Non-performing loans, Bank size, and Bank ROA. The loan controls include Loan amount, Loan maturity, 
Number of lenders, Collateral, Performance provisions, Financial covenants, Other covenants. Definitions for all variables are in 
Table 1 and summary statistics in Table 2. The ***, **, and * marks denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.   
 
  
(1) 
Mining & 
construction 
(2) 
Manufacturing 
(3) 
Transportation 
& utilities 
(4) 
Trade 
(5)  
Finance 
(6) 
Services 
(7)  
Full 
sample 
Taylor residuals × Bank 
capital × Firm risk 
1.991*** 2.039*** 1.468* 1.369* 0.169 1.350** 1.780*** 
(0.626) (0.659) (0.779) (0.750) (0.572) (0.549) (0.618) 
Marginal effect 38.6 39.6 18.5 24.6 3.3 27.2 34.5 
Observations 5,630 27,965 14,780 10,752 13,883 15,426 88,436 
Adjusted R-squared 0.844 0.871 0.905 0.844 0.931 0.874 0.883 
Bank controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Loan controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Loan type effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Loan purpose effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Bank effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Firm × year effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
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Table 7. Results from the pre-crisis period 
The table reports coefficient estimates and standard errors (in parentheses) clustered by bank, firm, and year. Dependent variable 
is Cost of loans and our sample covers 1984-2007. All specifications are estimated using OLS on equation (1). Marginal effect is 
the impact (in basis points) of a 1 pp decrease in the monetary policy variable for the firm with the mean soundness and the bank 
with a mean capital. The lower part of the table reports the control variables and the fixed effects used in each specification. The 
bank controls include Bank liquidity, Non-performing loans, Bank size, and Bank ROA. The loan controls include Loan amount, 
Loan maturity, Number of lenders, Collateral, Performance provisions, Financial covenants, Other covenants. Definitions for all 
variables are in Table 1 and summary statistics in Table 2. The ***, **, and * marks denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% levels.       
 
  
(1) 
Mining & 
construction 
(2) 
Manufacturing 
(3) 
Transportation 
& utilities 
(4) 
Trade 
(5)  
Finance 
(6) 
Services 
(7)  
Full 
sample 
Shadow rate × Bank 
capital × Firm risk 
1.592** 1.710** 0.927* 1.644* -0.280 1.509* 1.485** 
(0.630) (0.788) (0.495) (0.905) (0.516) (0.884) (0.665) 
Marginal effect 30.9 33.2 18.0 27.9 5.4 26.3 28.8 
Observations 2,378 11,779 6,868 5,915 7,116 8,464 42,520 
Adjusted R-squared 0.860 0.860 0.892 0.832 0.921 0.835 0.868 
Bank controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Loan controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Loan type effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Loan purpose effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Bank effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Firm × year effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
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Table 8. The role of loan amount and maturity 
The table reports coefficient estimates and standard errors (in parentheses) clustered by bank, firm, and year. Dependent 
variable is Cost of loans. All specifications are estimated using OLS on equation (1). Marginal effect is the impact (in 
basis points) of a 1 pp decrease in the monetary policy variable for the firm with the mean soundness and the bank with 
a mean capital. The lower part of the table reports the control variables and the fixed effects used in each specification. 
The bank controls include Bank liquidity, Non-performing loans, Bank size, and Bank ROA. The loan controls include 
Loan amount, Loan maturity, Number of lenders, Collateral, Performance provisions, Financial covenants, Other 
covenants. Definitions for all variables are in Table 1 and summary statistics in Table 2. The ***, **, and * marks denote 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.       
 
  
(1) 
Mining & 
construction 
(2) 
Manufacturing 
(3) 
Transportation 
& utilities 
(4) 
Trade 
(5)  
Finance 
(6) 
Services 
Shadow rate × Bank 
capital × Firm risk 
1.371*** 1.255** 0.843 1.244 0.444 1.258 
(0.462) (0.640) (0.520) (0.768) (0.830) (0.806) 
Marginal effect 26.6 24.4 16.4 24.1 8.6 24.4 
Loan amount × Bank 
capital × Firm risk 
9.114* 8.090 10.080 5.045 4.003 6.011 
(5.061) (7.968) (8.175) (6.096) (5.659) (6.362) 
Loan maturity × Bank 
capital × Firm risk 
1.573** 2.582*** 1.470** 1.991*** 1.364** 1.872*** 
(0.729) (0.518) (0.610) (0.341) (0.625) (0.526) 
Observations 5,630 27,965 14,780 10,752 13,883 15,426 
Adjusted R-squared 0.850 0.875 0.911 0.867 0.930 0.876 
Bank controls Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Loan controls Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Loan type effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Loan purpose effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Bank effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Firm × year effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
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Table 9. The role of loan guarantees 
The table reports coefficient estimates and standard errors (in parentheses) clustered by bank, firm, and year. Dependent 
variable is Cost of loans. All specifications are estimated using OLS on equation (1). Marginal effect is the impact (in basis 
points) of a 1 pp decrease in the monetary policy variable for the firm with the mean soundness and the bank with a mean 
capital. The lower part of the table reports the control variables and the fixed effects used in each specification. The bank 
controls include Bank liquidity, Non-performing loans, Bank size, and Bank ROA. The loan controls include Loan amount, 
Loan maturity, Number of lenders, Collateral, Performance provisions, Financial covenants, Other covenants. Definitions 
for all variables are in Table 1 and summary statistics in Table 2. The ***, **, and * marks denote statistical significance at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.       
 
  
(1) 
Mining & 
construction 
(2) 
Manufacturing 
(3) 
Transportation 
& utilities 
(4) 
Trade 
(5)  
Finance 
(6) 
Services 
Shadow rate × Bank capital 
× Firm risk 
1.332*** 1.240** 0.768 1.113 0.217 1.125 
(0.472) (0.627) (0.552) (0.748) (0.797) (0.749) 
Marginal effect 25.8 24.1 14.9 21.6 4.2 21.8 
Performance provisions × 
Bank capital × Firm risk 
-2.631*** 0.916 -1.060** -0.022 0.014 0.548 
(0.911) (3.185) (0.485) (0.514) (0.539) (0.460) 
General covenants x Bank 
capital × Firm risk 
-9.679 -1.026** 0.365 -1.257* 0.059 -1.443*** 
(1.058) (0.412) (0.918) (0.741) 0.061 (0.545) 
Observations 5,630 27,965 14,780 10,752 13,883 15,426 
Adjusted R-squared 0.853 0.876 0.925 0.853 0.925 0.882 
Bank controls Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Loan controls Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Loan type effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Loan purpose effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Bank effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Firm × year effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
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Table 10. Response of firm performance to the potency of the risk-taking 
channel 
The table reports coefficient estimates and standard errors (in parentheses) clustered by firm 
and year. Dependent variable in Panel A is Firm Tobin’s q in in year t+1 and in Panel B Firm 
ROA in year t+1. Predicted cost of loans is the partial prediction of Cost of loans to the Shadow 
rate, as obtained from the specifications of Table 4 for each industry. All specifications are 
estimated using OLS on equation (3). The lower part of the table reports the control variables 
and the fixed effects used in each specification. The controls include Firm cash flow, Firm 
leverage, Firm current ratio, Firm size, and Firm inefficiency. Definitions for all variables are 
in Table 1 and summary statistics in Table 2. The ***, **, and * marks denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.       
 
  
(1) 
Full sample 
(2) 
2002-2006 
(3) 
2007-2010 
(4) 
2010-2018 
Panel A: Dependent variable is Firm Tobin’s q 
Predicted cost of loans 
-0.246** -0.267*** -0.238** -0.203* 
(0.098) (0.086) (0.107) (0.106) 
Adjusted R-squared 0.317 0.533 0.378 0.370 
 
Panel B: Dependent variable is Firm ROA 
Predicted cost of loans 
-0.006** -0.011*** -0.007** -0.010** 
 (0.0027) (0.0042) (0.0033) (0.0040) 
Adjusted R-squared 0.235 0.287 0.261 0.203 
No. of firms 2,806 1,083 536 983 
Observations (firm-year) 71,335 26,711 13,271 24,317 
Firm controls Y Y Y Y 
Firm fixed effects Y Y Y Y 
Year fixed effects Y Y Y Y 
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Table 11. Response of firm performance by industry to the potency of the risk-taking channel 
The table reports coefficient estimates and standard errors (in parentheses) clustered by firm and year. Dependent variable 
in Panel A is Firm Tobin’s q in in year t+1 and in Panel B Firm ROA in year t+1. Predicted cost of loans is the partial 
prediction of Cost of loans to the Shadow rate, as obtained from the specifications of Table 4 for each industry. All 
specifications are estimated using OLS on equation (3). The lower part of the table reports the control variables and the 
fixed effects used in each specification. The controls include Firm cash flow, Firm leverage, Firm current ratio, Firm size, 
and Firm inefficiency. Definitions for all variables are in Table 1 and summary statistics in Table 2. The ***, **, and * 
marks denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.       
 
  
(1) 
Mining & 
construction 
(2) 
Manufacturing 
(3) 
Transportation 
& utilities 
(4) 
Trade 
(5)  
Finance 
(6) 
Services 
Panel A: Dependent variable is Firm Tobin’s q  
Predicted cost of loans 
-0.311*** -0.348*** -0.105 -0.117* -0.022 -0.229** 
(0.065) (0.089) (0.094) (0.061) (0.126) (0.111) 
Adjusted R-squared 0.295 0.388 0.226 0.311 0.185 0.447 
 
Panel B: Dependent variable is Firm ROA 
Predicted cost of loans 
-0.015*** -0.018*** -0.005 -0.008* 0.003 -0.008** 
(0.0037) (0.0051) (0.0062) (0.0046) (0.0068) (0.0032) 
Adjusted R-squared 0.229 0.294 0.188 0.340 0.197 0.306 
No. of firms 168 845 478 362 471 482 
Observations 4350 21516 11925 9867 12251 11426 
Firm controls Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Firm fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
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Online Appendix 
Industry Heterogeneity in the Risk-Taking Channel 
 
 
 
This appendix, intended for online use only, provides more summary statistics (by industry) and 
robustness checks on our empirical results. 
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Table A1. Key summary statistics by industry 
 
Mean Std. dev. 
Mining & construction 
Cost of loans 245.08 133.04 
Loan amount 18.38 1.49 
Loan maturity 41.18 30.27 
Firm Tobin’s q 1.48 1.85 
Firm leverage 0.38 0.67 
Manufacturing 
    
Cost of loans 255.57 136.98 
Loan amount 17.76 1.65 
Loan maturity 43.50 31.37 
Firm Tobin’s q 1.51 2.54 
Firm leverage 0.39 0.69 
Transportation & utilities 
Cost of loans 213.52 123.02 
Loan amount 18.91 1.62 
Loan maturity 51.22 30.50 
Firm Tobin’s q 1.61 1.81 
Firm leverage 0.33 0.28 
Trade 
    
Cost of loans 224.33 122.03 
Loan amount 18.09 1.50 
Loan maturity 43.57 29.30 
Firm Tobin’s q 1.59 1.45 
Firm leverage 0.33 0.30 
     
Finance     
Cost of loans 203.71 102.79 
Loan amount 18.76 1.50 
Loan maturity 34.47 28.95 
Firm Tobin’s q 1.35 0.96 
Firm leverage 0.42 0.98 
Services 
    
Cost of loans 254.88 119.92 
Loan amount 17.92 1.62 
Loan maturity 44.32 32.14 
Firm Tobin’s q 1.79 1.28 
Firm leverage 0.32 0.31 
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Table A2. Using firm leverage as firm risk in the triple interaction 
The table reports coefficient estimates and standard errors (in parentheses) clustered by bank, firm, and year. Dependent variable 
is Cost of loans. All specifications are estimated using OLS on equation (1). Marginal effect is the impact (in basis points) of a 1 
pp decrease in the monetary policy variable for the firm with the mean soundness and the bank with a mean capital. The lower part 
of the table reports the control variables and the fixed effects used in each specification. The bank controls include Bank liquidity, 
Non-performing loans, Bank size, and Bank ROA. The loan controls include Loan amount, Loan maturity, Number of lenders, 
Collateral, Performance provisions, Financial covenants, Other covenants. Definitions for all variables are in Table 1 and summary 
statistics in Table 2. The ***, **, and * marks denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.       
 
  
(1) 
Mining & 
construction 
(2) 
Manufacturing 
(3) 
Transportation 
& utilities 
(4) 
Trade 
(5)  
Finance 
(6) 
Services 
(7)  
Full 
sample 
Shadow rate × Bank 
capital × Firm leverage 
-4.571** -4.355** -3.710* -3.805* -1.662 -2.727 -3.794** 
(2.021) (1.914) (2.005) (1.949) (1.934) (2.310) (1.853) 
Marginal effect 20.5 19.6 11.7 17.1 7.5 12.2 17.0 
Observations 5,630 27,965 14,780 10,752 13,883 15,426 88,436 
Adjusted R-squared 0.859 0.894 0.911 0.852 0.950 0.883 0.894 
Bank controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Loan controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Loan type effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Loan purpose effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Bank effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Firm × year effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
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Table A3. Using bank liquidity in the triple interaction 
The table reports coefficient estimates and standard errors (in parentheses) clustered by bank, firm, and year. Dependent variable is 
Cost of loans. All specifications are estimated using OLS on equation (1). Marginal effect is the impact (in basis points) of a 1 pp 
decrease in the monetary policy variable for the firm with the mean soundness and the bank with a mean capital. The lower part of 
the table reports the control variables and the fixed effects used in each specification. The bank controls include Bank liquidity, Non-
performing loans, Bank size, and Bank ROA. The loan controls include Loan amount, Loan maturity, Number of lenders, Collateral, 
Performance provisions, Financial covenants, Other covenants. Definitions for all variables are in Table 1 and summary statistics in 
Table 2. The ***, **, and * marks denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.       
 
  
(1) 
Mining & 
construction 
(2) 
Manufacturing 
(3) 
Transportation 
& utilities 
(4) 
Trade 
(5)  
Finance 
(6) 
Services 
(7)  
Full 
sample 
Shadow rate × Bank 
liquidity × Firm risk 
4.031*** 3.855*** 2.690* 2.048** 0.545 2.235* 2.916** 
(1.371) (1.281) (1.396) (1.060) (0.462) (1.195) (1.244) 
Marginal effect 32.2 30.8 16.5 16.4 4.4 17.9 23.3 
Observations 5,630 27,965 14,780 10,752 13,883 15,426 88,436 
Adjusted R-squared 0.844 0.871 0.905 0.844 0.931 0.874 0.883 
Bank controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Loan controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Loan type effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Loan purpose effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Bank effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Firm × year effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
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Table A4. Are loan controls bad controls? 
The table reports coefficient estimates and standard errors (in parentheses) clustered by bank, firm, and year. Dependent variable is 
Cost of loans. Specifications (1) to (3) report the results from the estimation of equation (1) using OLS; specifications (4) to (6) report 
the results from the estimation of equations (2) and (3) using Heckman’s model. The dependent variable in the first-stage of Heckman’s 
model is Loan initiation. Marginal effect is the impact (in basis points) of a 1 pp decrease in the monetary policy variable for the firm 
with the mean soundness and the bank with a mean capital. The lower part of the table reports the control variables and the fixed 
effects used in each specification. The bank controls include Bank liquidity, Non-performing loans, Bank size, and Bank ROA. 
Definitions for all variables are in Table 1 and summary statistics in Table 2. The ***, **, and * marks denote statistical significance 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.    
 OLS model Heckman’s model 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Shadow rate × Bank capital 
× Firm risk 
1.339** 1.324** 1.301** 1.396** 1.370** 1.347** 
(0.593) (0.579) (0.594) (0.597) (0.582) (0.598) 
Marginal effect 26 25.7 25.2 27.1 26.6 26.1 
Maturity 0.804***  0.805*** 0.802***  0.803*** 
 (0.181)  (0.180) (0.180)  (0.180) 
Loan amount -7.550***  -7.230*** -7.530***  -7.211*** 
 (0.821)  (0.820) (0.821)  (0.819) 
Number of lenders -0.465***  -0.381*** -0.466***  -0.382*** 
 (0.145)  (0.132) (0.144)  (0.131) 
Collateral  -0.894 -2.052  -0.914 -2.069 
  (3.980) (4.001)  (3.976) (3.997) 
Performance provisions  -20.004*** -17.837***  -19.933*** -17.772*** 
  (2.649) (2.331)  (2.649) (2.331) 
Financial covenants  -1.733 -0.850  -1.752 -0.868 
  (1.445) (1.457)  (1.455) (1.466) 
General covenants  15.784*** 16.509***  15.846*** 16.570*** 
  (4.347) (4.224)  (4.346) (4.221) 
First stage       
Shadow rate × Bank capital 
× Firm risk 
   -6.642*** -6.530*** -6.591*** 
   (2.435) (2.410) (2.420) 
Observations 88,436 88,436 88,436 88,436 88,436 88,436 
Adjusted R-squared 0.880 0.883 0.880 0.880 0.883 0.880 
Bank controls Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Loan type effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Loan purpose effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Bank effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Firm × year effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
 
